




In a recent archive post ([1]) Shan Gao has argued that quantum
theory is incompatible with relativity. He calls this a new proof beyond
Bells theorem, arguing elsewhere ([2]) that it closes the superdeterminism
loophole in Bells theorem. Such strong claims must be backed up by
irrefutable arguments. My aim in this post to the workshop "Beyond
Bells theorem" is to refute Gaos "proof" and to show how quantum
theory is compatible with relativity theory and so why Gaos "proof"
does not take us beyond Bells theorem.
1 Introduction
In a recent archive post [1] Shan Gao has argued that quantum theory is incom-
patible with relativity. He calls this a new proof beyond Bells theorem, arguing
elsewhere ([2]) that it closes the superdeterminism loophole in Bells theorem.
Such strong claims must be backed up by irrefutable arguments. My aim in this
post to the workshop "Beyond Bells theorem" is to refute Gaos "proof" and
to show how quantum theory is compatible with relativity theory and so why
Gaos "proof" does not take us beyond Bells theorem.
Gao seeks to derive a contradiction between quantum theory and relativity
by applying them both together in the scenario of a Gedankenexperiment. Since
his argument proceeds by reductio ad absurdum it is irrelevant to its soundness
that this Gedankenexperiment is totally impracticable. Alice and Bob each
perform a measurement of spin-component on a (di¤erent) particle in a pair
they have prepared in the spin singlet state
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In §2 of [1] he uses this familiar scenario to show why theories of the quantum
world that postulate a physical process of quantum state collapse that occurs
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simultaneously in di¤erent regions of space in a preferred Lorentz frame are
incompatible with fundamental Lorentz invariance. This is a familiar result,
and Gao does not maintain that it takes us beyond Bells theorem.
2 The main argument
Gao goes on in §3 of [1] to consider views of quantum theory that postulate no
such physical process of quantum state collapse on measurement, maintaining
on the contrary that the interaction between a system and a measuring device
may be modeled as the unitary evolution of their joint quantum state. In this
section he describes a less familar scenario in which Alice and Bob are joined
by a superobserver who is able to reset Alices entire laboratory to its initial
pre-measurement quantum state by a local interaction that may be modeled by
a unitary evolution (namely the adjoint of the unitary transformation used to
model the e¤ects on her lab of Alices measurement on particle 1).
Gao argues that this permits the existence of a correlation between Alices
and Bobs measurement results stronger than the correlations of Bell inequali-
ties, and that this reveals the incompatibility between unitary quantum theo-
ries and special relativity. Gao splits the class of unitary quantum theories into
single-world theories and many-worlds theories before treating each subclass
separately. Here I shall consider only single-world unitary quantum theories,
leaving to the reader the extension of my critique of Gaos argument to many-
world theories.
Suppose Alice and Bob are each in their own laboratories, totally physically
isolated from the rest of the world and from each other with two exceptions:
they share a pair of particles in state (1), and there is a superobserver able to
apply a very carefully tailored local "reset" interaction just to Alices laboratory.
Alice and Bob are going to measure the same component (say z-spin) on the
particles of a pair assigned state (1), Alice on particle 1, Bob on particle 2.
In a rst scenario, suppose Alice measures (the z -spin of) 1 before (in the lab
frame) Bob measures 2, and afterwards (again in the lab frame) the superob-
server resets Alices lab to its original state, thereby also resetting the state (1)
of the particle pair. Before Bob measures 2, this sequence of Alice-measurement
followed by superobserver reset is repeated many times. For every repetition,
the Born rule yields probability 1/2 for each of the two possible outcomes of
each of Alices z -spin measurements on 1. The probability distribution over
all Alices repeated outcomes assigns a relatively high probability to a sequence
with an equal number of +1 and -1 outcomes, but a very low probability to
a sequence of all +1 outcomes, and to a sequence of all -1 outcomes (where a
z -spin positive outcome is labeled +1, and a z -spin negative outcome is labeled
-1). Neither Alice nor any other agent can know the actual sequence of Alices
outcomes in this scenario because the superobservers intervention e¤ectively
erases all records of the outcome of each of Alices measurements.
In a second scenario, suppose instead that Bob rst measures (the z -spin of)
2 before (in the lab frame) Alice ever measures 1. The perfect anticorrelations
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predicted by the Born rule now assign probability 1 to the sequence of outcomes
of Alices repeated z -spin measurements in which every one of her outcomes is
the opposite of Bobs single outcome, and probability 0 to every other possible
sequence of outcomes of Alices z -spin measurements.
No matter what the actual sequence of outcomes of Alices z -spin measure-
ments, the probability assigned to it by application of the Born rule di¤ers in the
two scenarios. If all Alices measurements occurred at spacelike separation from
Bobs measurement, then the only di¤erence in these scenarios is that Alices
measurements preceded Bobs single measurement in the lab frame in the rst
scenario, but succeeded Bobs single measurement in the second scenario. But
relativity implies that this di¤erence can have no physical relevance because it
takes the two scenarios to be physically equivalent in special relativity they
are related by a Lorentz boost symmetry. Gao concludes that quantum theory
is incompatible with relativity.
He further agues that Bobs measurement instantaneously inuences the out-
come of Alices measurement because after Bobs measurement the probability
of any of Alices subsequent measurements di¤ers from what it would have been
had Bob not made his measurement.
3 Refutation of the main argument
In this section I show why a correct application of quantum theory shows why
Gaos main argument, restated in the previous section, fails to establish its








Figure 1: Space-time diagram for Gaos main argument
The vertical lines in Figure 1 represent worldlines of (the centers of) Alices and
Bobs labs, and the circles labeled a - e represent the spacetime locations of
ve of Alices repeated spin-component measurements on particle 1. Light-lines
emanating from some points on Alices labs worldline and terminating at points
marked with xs on Bobs labs worldline are represented by diagonal lines in
the gure.
Gaos rst scenario is represented in the gure if Bobs measurement on par-
ticle 2 occurs in the vicinity of the point labeled 4. As the gure indicates, this
event succeeds Alices measurements a - e in the lab frame, even though it is
spacelike separated from all of these. The second scenario is represented if Bobs
measurement on particle 2 occurs in the vicinity of the point labeled 3. This
event precedes Alices measurements a - e in the lab frame, even though it is
also spacelike separated from all of these. To refute Gaos main argument and
ensure the compatibility of quantum theory with relativity in this Gedankenex-
periment, it su¢ ces to show that correct applications of quantum theorys Born
rule yield the same probability distribution for Alices sequence of outcomes in
measurements a - e in both scenarios.
In the rst scenario Gao argued that the Born rule yields a probability dis-
tribution that assigns a relatively high probability to a sequence with an equal
number of +1 and -1 outcomes, but a very low probability to a sequence of all
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+1 outcomes, and to a sequence of all -1 outcomes. This is correct, though not
because the event marked 4 occurs later than Alices repeated measurements in
the lab frame, but because that event is spacelike separated from those mea-
surements. Since a measurement by Bob at point 4 is spacelike separated from
all of Alices measurements a - e, its outcome is not accessible to Alice before
she makes any of those measurements. Consequently she is not in a position
to update her assignment of a quantum state to particle 1 and should continue
to apply the Born rule to that same (reduced, mixed) state to calculate the
probability distribution for her sequence of measurement outcomes. (It is im-
portant to note in passing that any such updating would not commit Alice (or
the one-world unitarian) to a physical process of quantum state collapse).
In the second scenario Gao argued that the Born rules yields probability 1
for the sequence of outcomes of Alices repeated z -spin measurements in which
every outcome is the opposite of Bobs single outcome of a measurement at point
3, and probability 0 to every other possible sequence of outcomes of Alices z -
spin measurements. This is incorrect. A measurement by Bob at point 3 is also
spacelike separated from Alices measurements a - e, even though it occurs earlier
than them in the lab frame. The outcome of a measurement by Bob at point
3 is just as inaccessible to Alice before she makes any of those measurements
as would be the outcome of a measurement by Bob at point 4. So, just as
in the rst scenario, Alice is not in a position to update her assignment of
a quantum state to particle 1 and should continue to apply the Born rule to
that same (reduced, mixed) state to calculate the probability distribution for
her sequence of measurement outcomes. Correctly applied, quantum theorys
Born rule predicts the same probability distribution for Alices outcomes in both
scenarios, so no contradiction ensues.
What if Bobs measurement occurred at some point between those labeled 1
and 2 in the gure? In that scenario, Bobs outcome would become accessible to
Alice part way through the sequence of her repeated measurements a - e when
her past light cone includes Bobs outcome right after c, for example. Only at
that point, Alice should update the quantum state she assigns to particle 1 to
a pure state for which (correct) application of the Born rule yields probability
1 for the outcome of her next measurement (d in this case) to be opposite to
Bobs outcome, as also for the outcomes of her subsequent measurements (e.g.
e). In this third scenario Alice should continue to assign probability 1/2 to her
next outcome (such as a or b) for a while, even though (in the lab frame) Bob
has already made his measurement!
Bobs measurement does not instantaneously inuence the outcome of Al-
ices measurement. It does not even alter "the" probability of that outcome.
The probability of Alices outcome conditional on a particular outcome of Bobs
measurement is unchanged by Bobs actual measurement, whatever its actual
outcome. The unconditional probability of Alices outcome does change as Al-
ices labs world line passes into the future light cone of Bobs measurement
outcome, but this change is compatible with relativity and does not constitute
a causal inuence of Bobs measurement or its outcome on Alices measurement
or its outcome (see my ([3])). The argument of ([1]) does not take us beyond
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Bells theorem, and ([2]) does not close a loophole in Bells theorem.
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